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Abstract.   There  is  no  complete  overview  or  discussion  of  the  literature  of 
the economics of federalism and fiscal decentralization, even though scholarly 
interest in the topic has been increasing significantly over recent years. This paper 
provides a general, brief but comprehensive overview of the main insights from 
the literature on fiscal federalism and decentralization. In doing so, literature 
on fiscal federalism and decentralization is grouped into two main approaches: 
‘first generation approach’ and ‘an emerging second generation approach’. The 
discussion generally covers the two notions of fiscal decentralization: ‘fiscal 
autonomy’ and ‘fiscal importance’ of subnational governments as the background 
of the most recently developed index of fiscal decentralization in Vo. The relevance 
of this discussion to any further development of a fiscal decentralization index is 
briefly noted. 
 
Keywords. Decentralization   theorem;   Musgravian   fiscal   framework;   Public 
choice; Tiebout sorting 
 
 
Decentralisation has, not only an administrative value, but also a civic dimension, 
since it increases the opportunities  for citizens to take interest in public affairs; 
it makes them get accustomed to using freedom. And from the accumulation  of 
these local, active, persnickety freedoms, is born the most efficient counterweight 
against  the claims  of the central  government,  even if it were supported  by an 
impersonal, collective will. 
 
(A. De Tocqueville (1805–1859), 
in A History of Decentralisation, World Bank, 2003) 
 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
The term ‘fiscal decentralization’  refers to the devolution  of authority  for public 
finances and the delivery of government services from the national to subnational levels 
(Tanzi, 1995). This devolution is related to the four main interrelationships among 
levels of government  regarding fiscal issues, namely the responsibility  for (i) 
expenditure  decisions;  (ii) taxing and revenue-raising  powers; (iii) subnational 
borrowings  and  (iv)  intergovernmental  fiscal  transfers.  Fiscal  decentralization  is 
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currently  an  issue  of considerable  practical  importance  facing  many  developing 
economies and has been advocated by international  economic bodies, such as the 
World  Bank  and  the  Organisation  for  Economic  Cooperation  and  Development 
(World  Bank,  2003).  Moreover,  the  academic  study  of fiscal  decentralization  is 
a field  of vigorous  research  activity  and a number  of attempts  have  been  made 
to  systematically  understand  the  key  economic  principles  of  this  area  (see,  for 
example, McLure, 1998; Collins, 2001; Boadway, 2003; Bird, 2004). The number 
of publications  on fiscal federalism  is much smaller than those for the other key 
topics  such  as unemployment,  inflation,  exchange  rate,  interest  rate and foreign 
direct investment.  However,  the area is growing  rapidly. In fact, with an average 
growth rate of about 28% per annum, fiscal federalism is the second-fastest growing 
field among these important fields. 
The topic of fiscal federalism was generally introduced into public finance theory 
in the mid twentieth century, which opened the door to the systematic analysis of 
fiscal decentralization.  The main normative  question  associated  with this subject 
concerns the extent to which fiscal powers and responsibilities  should be devolved 
from higher to lower levels of government.  The level of analysis associated  with 
this  question  has  now  developed  to  the  extent  where  scholars  have  started  to 
distinguish  between first and second generation  theories of fiscal decentralization 
(Oates,  2005, p. 349). The second  generation  theory  of fiscal decentralization  is 
only newly emerging and it does not yet represent a coherent system of analysis, 
or at least, it has not been well established. 
It is noted that the focus of this paper is exclusively on theoretical developments 
on the issue of fiscal federalism and decentralization, rather than empirical 
developments.  In  this  paper,  the  first  generation  approach  to  public  economics 
of decentralization  is overviewed in Section 2, with attention given to the seminal 
contributions by distinguished scholars such as Richard Musgrave, Wallace Oates, 
Charles  Tiebout  and  James  Buchanan.  The  treatment  of  the  four  main  issues, 
namely  the assignment  of responsibility  for service  provision,  the assignment  of 
taxing  powers,  intergovernmental  fiscal  transfers  and  subnational  borrowing,  in 
the first generation  theory of fiscal decentralization  is discussed  in Section  3. A 
brief discussion of the newly emerging second generation approaches to fiscal 
decentralization,  which draws on ideas from outside the public finance literature, 
is included in Section 4, which is followed by conclusions in Section 5. 
 
 
2.  First Generation Approaches to the Public Economics of Decentralization 
 
A  policy  of  fiscal  decentralization   is  directed  towards  the  transfer  of  fiscal 
powers and responsibilities  from the national to subnational governments  (SNGs). 
While   fiscal  centralization   is  often  a  response   to  the  demands   of  national 
unity,  fiscal  decentralization   may  be  seen  as  a  response  to  the  demands  for 
diversity and accountability within the community. On balance, the first generation 
theorists  investigating  fiscal  federalism  tended  to associate  the  process  of fiscal 
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decentralization with an enhancement in the overall degree of public sector 
responsiveness  to  a  public  demand  and,  ultimately,  to  an  improvement  in  the  
economic  efficiency  of  public  economic  activities  by  better  linking  resource 
allocation with public preferences. 
Among many different economic ideas about decentralization of public functions 
to SNGs, and the associated issue of public finances under decentralized  systems, 
seminal contributions  were made by Tiebout (1956), Musgrave  (1959) and Oates 
(1972), all of whom laid the strong foundation for significant discussions of fiscal 
decentralization. Olson (1969), through his concept of fiscal equivalence, also made 
an important contribution. These studies, in conjunction with the public choice 
approach  to multi-tier  government  initially  developed  by Brennan  and Buchanan 
(1980)  in  The  Power  to Tax  – Analytical  Foundations  of a Fiscal  Constitution, 
represent seminal works in the first generation literature on fiscal decentralization. 
 
 
2.1  Musgravian Fiscal Framework and Federalism 
 
In the influential book The Theory of Public Finance – A Study in Public Economy, 
Musgrave   (1959)  introduced   three  different  branches  or  categories   of  public 
finance: economic stabilization, income distribution and resources allocation. These 
branches have come to represent the benchmarks from which issues in public 
economics are treated by the non-public choice group within their first generation 
studies  of  fiscal  decentralization.  In  general  terms,  each  branch  is  individually 
subject to consistent theoretical analysis. Between these branches, analytical 
consistency  is  more  difficult  because  of  diverse  and  subjective  assessments  of 
the  relative  importance  of  stabilization,  income  distributions  and  efficiency.  In 
the specific public finance perspective  on federalism, the Musgravian  branches of 
public finance proved useful in setting the constraints to fiscal decentralization 
(stabilization  and distribution)  and the potential benefits of fiscal decentralization 
(efficiency). 
The   first   branch   is   economic   stabilization.   Fiscal   and   monetary   policies 
may  contribute  to  stable  economic  development.  The  key  issue  for  theory  is 
whether  fiscal decentralization  enhances  or detracts  from economic  stability  and 
compromises the general macroeconomic goals of governments. The received view 
among first generation theorists is clear: decentralization of fiscal arrangement does 
not serve to enhance the macro stabilization  objective;  rather, macro stabilization 
represents a constraint on the feasible degree to which fiscal powers can be devolved 
to SNGs (Oates, 1972, p. 7). 
The second branch of public economics concerns income distribution. Economic 
goods  are produced  and governments  typically  play some role in modifying  the 
market determined distribution of goods across members of a given society. Taxes 
may  be  progressive  and  welfare  services  may  target  lower  income  members  of 
society.  Again,  it  appears  that  decentralization  of  fiscal  arrangements  does  not 
tend to systematically advance society’s income distribution objectives because 
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economic  interdependences  between  the  economies  of  subnational  jurisdictions 
act  to reduce  any  diversity  in the  distribution  of goods  that  would  exist  across 
lower  level  governments.   In  the  absence  of  diversity   in  redistribution   goals 
between  SNGs,  if the  demand  for  redistribution  is nationally  uniform,  the  case  
for assigning  responsibility  for redistribution  to SNGs  is weakened.  In short, an 
income redistribution  policy has a greater chance of success if it is carried out at 
the national level (Oates, 1972, p. 9). 
It is  in  the  final  branch  of  public  economics  – resources  allocation  – where 
the importance  of fiscal decentralization  emerges  in the work of first generation 
theorists. This is so for two main reasons. First, scarce resources should be more 
efficiently allocated under a decentralized fiscal system, as SNGs may be in a better 
position of understanding  how to maximize  benefits from the use of resources in 
their localities. Second, the character of ‘impure’ or local public goods adds a local 
congestion  dimension  to service provision  that national  governments  may not be 
well placed to manage. In short, if the ‘local’ dimension of public goods is ignored, 
provision  of  such  goods  at  the  same  level  across  all  regions  will  compromise 
efficiency when preferences  for local public goods differ by regions, jurisdictions 
or levels of government. As a result, SNGs have the potential to play a major role 
in efficient  resource  allocation.  In this branch of public economics,  the intention 
to mobilize resources regionally is recognized so that the preferences and tastes of 
heterogeneous  inhabitants can be better served. 
Consequently,  within  the  Musgravian  framework,  the  first  generation  theory 
of fiscal decentralization primarily emphasizes the brand of public economics 
concerned  with  the  efficiency  of  resource  allocation.  When  the  first  generation 
theory considers  fiscal decentralization,  such as in the assignment  of expenditure 
responsibility   and  revenue-raising   powers,  it  is  primarily  aimed  at  achieving 
efficient  resource  allocation   which  maximizes   welfares  for  constituencies.   In 
addition,  intergovernmental  fiscal transfer  systems  from the national  government 
to SNGs and the autonomy  of SNGs’ borrowings  are also discussed  in a similar 
manner in the first generation theory of fiscal decentralization.  While the branches 
of public finance concerned with economic stabilization  (to maintain an economy 
at high levels of employment  and stable price level) and income  distribution  (to 
achieve horizontal equity and vertical equity in a manner that avoids inefficiency, 
and to avoid mobility of households and firms across jurisdictions) are considered 
within the first generation theory of fiscal decentralization, they are generally 
considered as secondary to the degree of fiscal decentralization. 
 
 
2.2  Tiebout Sorting 
 
Samuelson’s optimal level of public goods provision cannot be obtained since there 
is no mechanism for preference revelation. Tiebout (1956) introduced the notion of 
‘impure’ or local public goods to the theory of public finance. He did so to analyse 
political and fiscal decentralization  in terms of competition among localities, with 
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the mobility of citizens between localities providing the mechanism for preference 
revelation.  The  essence  of the  Tiebout  hypothesis  is that  consumer  demand  for 
local  public  goods  can  be revealed  when  citizens  choose  the jurisdiction  which 
provides them with the best net benefit. The hypothesis states that, with mobility, 
consumer-voter’s  preferences can be revealed and consumers will end up at, or at 
least close to, the point where their demand for impure public goods is met with  
due recognition of the costs of supplying this demand. This is now generally known 
as ‘Tiebout sorting’. In particular, this notion of Tiebout’s was primarily a response 
to the problem of the under-provision of public goods as posed by Paul Samuelson. 
Tiebout shows that when public goods are provided by competing regions, sorting 
according to preferences will induce an efficient provision. 
Tiebout’s   notion   of   ‘impure’   public   goods   differs   from   global   or   pure 
public  goods,  as  developed  by  Samuelson  (1954),  which  are  defined  by  two 
main  characteristics:  ‘non-excludability’  and  ‘non-rivalry’  in consumption.  Non- 
excludability  means that once public goods are produced, no one can be excluded 
from consuming them. Non-rivalry requires that the marginal benefits that any 
consumer  derives  from  the  consumption  of  public  goods  do  not  change  if  the 
number of consumers increases. National defence is the classic example of the pure 
public good. Once this service is produced, it is impossible, or at least inefficient, 
to exclude  any person  in a community  from its consumption  (Buchanan,  1999). 
Additional  residents  are added  to a jurisdiction  and consume  pure public  goods 
without any additional costs. The characteristic of non-rivalry of pure public goods 
has implied a consequence which was mentioned by Samuelson (1954). 
In response to Samuelson’s concerns over preference revelation of public goods, 
Tiebout (1956) argued that many public goods, such as parks, are actually ‘impure’ 
because they are subject to congestion (i.e. they are not rival, or progressively less 
rival, beyond some locally defined boundary). When the number of users increases, 
public goods consumption may become congested. 
Tiebout’s  vision  is in contrast  with Samuelson’s  work, which  emphasizes  that 
preferences  for publicly  provided  goods  are not revealed  because  the revelation 
would result in an increase in payment to the citizen who declares his preference 
without any increase in the quantity of the public good provided (Hamilton, 1987). 
In short,  the Samuelsonian  approach  considers  ‘pure’  public  goods  whereas  the 
Tiebout approach emphasizes the ‘impurity’ of public goods. Mobility among 
jurisdictions is possible even though there are some typical obstacles to consumer 
mobility, such as job commitment and family connection (Oates, 2005, p. 350). In a 
decentralized society, consumers will effectively sort themselves into homogeneous 
groups whose demands for certain public goods and services are the same (Oates, 
2005, p. 353). As such, decentralized provision of local public goods and services 
is essential. 
A significant aspect of Tiebout sorting is its relevance to policymakers,  and the 
consequent  implications  for fiscal arrangements.  Policies to encourage  residential 
mobility and develop knowledge among residents of public benefits and costs will 
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encourage migration which acts as a force that contributes to improvements  in the 
efficiency of government expenditures. It is also argued that the higher the revealed 
degree of mobility of households  from region to region, the higher the efficiency 
of the allocation  of resources,  other things held constant (Tiebout,  1956). This is 
because there would be no mobility of households and firms when all subnational 
units are in an equilibrium state – benefits provided would be consistent with costs. 
As a result,  due  to the  pressure  on governments  from  this  mobility,  production 
efficiency will be enhanced.  
In  summary,   Tiebout   has   made   two   main   contributions   to  the  study   of 
fiscal  decentralization.  First,  he  introduced  the  notion  that  it  is  impure  public 
goods  that  are  provided  by  SNGs.  Second,  he  demonstrated  that  mobility  of 
taxpayers – voters – between jurisdictions represents the mechanism by which 
individuals reveal their preference for ‘impure’ public goods. 
 
 
2.3  Fiscal Equivalence and the Decentralization Theorem 
 
Olson (1969) introduced  the seminal  notion of ‘fiscal equivalence’  to economics 
within a general framework for investigations of fiscal decentralization. ‘Fiscal 
equivalence’  is the notion which posits that, for every collective  good, there is a 
unique ‘boundary’  for which a separate government  is needed, so that ‘there can 
be a match between those who receive the benefits of a collective good and those 
who pay for it’ (Olson, 1969, p. 483). In broad terms, it positively associates the 
efficiency goal of public economics with aligning the costs and benefits of impure 
public good provision with multi-tiered federal systems, each with overlapping physical 
boundaries,  but each with unique boundaries  relating to the provision of specific 
public goods. 
The  next  seminal  contribution  was  made  by  Oates  (1972)  in  his  monograph 
Fiscal Federalism.  Oates  implicitly  blended  Olson’s  notion  of fiscal  equivalence 
with  aspects  of Tiebout’s  notion  of impure  public  goods  in his theory  of fiscal 
decentralization,   although  without  focusing  directly  on  household  mobility  or 
sorting.  He  argued  that  there  should  be  a  variation  of  the  provision  of  impure 
public goods and services from governments since inhabitants have different tastes 
for public services. Oates formalizes his treatment of the issue by defining public goods 
in a manner that comprises both pure and impure public good attributes. All that 
matters  is that benefits  from non-excludable  and non-rival  public  goods  are linked 
to a population  in a geographic  subset (impure public goods) or the union of 
population  from all such subsets (pure public goods). From this, he developed the 
decentralization theorem. 
 
For  a public  good  –  the  consumption  of  which  is  defined  over  geographical 
subsets  of  the  total  population,  and  for  which  the  costs  of  providing  each level  
of  output  of  the  good  in  each  jurisdiction  are  the  same  for  the  central or  the  
respective  local  government  –  it  will  always  be  more  efficient  (or  at least as 
efficient) for local governments  to provide the Pareto-efficient  levels of output for 
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their respective jurisdictions than for the central government to provide any specified 
and uniform level of output across all jurisdictions.  (Oates, 1972, p. 35) 
 
Oates’s  decentralization  theorem  has  a  clear  rationale.  Welfare  is  maximized 
when specific public goods are provided by local governments  whose jurisdiction 
corresponds  to  the  subset  of  the  national  population  for  which  the  demand  for 
specific  public  goods  and  services  is  homogeneous.  If  the  national  government 
is assumed  to provide  the  same  bundle  of public  goods  and  services  across  all 
subnational  jurisdictions,  then it will not be possible for the national government  
to provide the efficient level unless preferences are homogeneous  for all members 
of the population. 
Oates’s assumptions  on uniform provision of public goods by national govern- 
ments do not reflect reality in any strict sense. Indeed, this assumption  has been 
criticized by Brennan and Buchanan (1980). However, it may be a reasonable 
approximation  for two main reasons. First, the national government does not have 
extensive  information  on a diversity  of local preferences  and tastes.  There is an 
asymmetry of information relating to local tastes between the national government 
and  SNGs.  Second,  while  national  governments  can  provide  different  levels  or 
different types of public services in different regions, there are political constraints 
for the extent to which this can happen. In this regard, the national government is, 
to some extent, constrained to provide uniform goods and services across regions to 
avoid possible adverse political consequences which may arise from differentiating 
the level of goods and services provided across subnational jurisdictions. Related to 
this are potential constitutional  constraints. For example, in Australia, the Federal 
Government is required to treat states the same – different rates of the Goods and 
Services Tax could not apply in New South Wales and Western Australia, even if 
levels of public services demanded in these two states are different. 
Oates’s decentralization  theorem is also predicated  on the two other restrictive 
assumptions  concerning  economies  of scale and externalities.  First, it is assumed 
that provision  costs are the same  when  public  goods  are provided  by either  the 
national  government  or all SNGs  together.  If this  is not the case,  it is possible 
that  centralized  provision  may  be  less  expensive  when  there  are  economies  of 
scale.  However,  even  this  has  been  criticized  by  Wagner  (2007,  pp.  164–167), 
who  argues  that  economies  of  scale  are  largely  irrelevant  to  the  size  of  SNG 
units.  When  particular  government  services  benefit  from  economies  of  large- 
scale  production,  large  SNGs  enjoying  economies  of large-scale  production  can 
produce  these  services  for  sale  to other  small-scale  SNGs.  That  is,  SNGs  with 
diseconomies  of scale can purchase  public services from larger SNGs which can 
exploit their economies of scale. As such, some government units articulate demand 
for services  whereas  the others  produce  services  for different  governments  on a 
contractual  basis.  Second,  there  are no externalities  in public  goods  provision  – 
each  level  of  government  provides  an  efficient  amount  of  public  goods  to  a 
respective  constituency.  As a result,  there  is an existence  of a so-called  perfect 
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mapping – local governments  provide goods and services which bring benefits to 
local people in the same region only. This too is a very ‘strong’ assumption because 
it is, in practice,  almost  impossible  to limit the benefits  of locally  public  goods 
provided in a specified region. Externalities always go together with any provision 
of public goods. 
The  important  contribution  of  first  generation  theory  is  that  it  reveals  that 
efficient  levels of publicly  provided  outputs  are more typically  achieved  through 
multi-tiered systems of government than through a unitary system of government. 
Welfare  benefits  from  decentralization  are  likely  to be greatest  when  there  is a 
diversity of preferences for impure local public goods. However, the limits of these 
findings  – due to the restrictive  assumptions  used  to derive  the decentralization  
theorem – cannot be overlooked. At some point, the level of fiscal decentralization 
will become inefficient  as economies  of scale for public good provisions  are lost 
and negative fiscal externalities emerge. 
 
2.4  Public Choice and Leviathan 
 
The  final  stream  of  the  first  generation  theory  derives  from  the  public  choice 
literature,   which  reaches  back  into  intellectual   history  for  its  motivation.   In 
1660,  Thomas  Hobbes  described  the  notion  of  the  Leviathan,  or  to  be  called 
a  Commonwealth  or  State,  as  ‘an  artificial  man,  though  of  greater  stature  and 
strength than the natural, for whose protection and defence it was intended; and in 
which the sovereignty  is an artificial soul, as giving life and motion to the whole 
body. . .’ (Hobbes, 1660, p. 1). 
Brennan  and  Buchanan  (1980)  revived  the  notion  of  the  State  as  Leviathan. 
They  developed  the  hypothesis  that  the  main  interest  of  the  government  is  to 
tax heavily so that they have financial  resources  to spend. In this representation, 
the  government  is a monolithic  Leviathan,  which  always  seeks  to maximize  its 
taxation  revenue.  In  response  to  this  issue,  the  only  way  to  limit  the  extent 
of government oversupply, and as a consequence over-taxation, is to constrain 
governments through effective constitutions that decentralize political and fiscal 
authority.  When political action has the motivational  characteristics  of Leviathan, 
political  and  fiscal  decentralization  divides,  competition  between  public  bodies 
reduces  the  force  to  grow  the  public  sector.  In  addition,  the  ‘protective  state’, 
which  establishes  the government  as enforcer  of individual  rights  and contracts, 
carries the functions which can be effectively allocated, by competition processes, 
to  the  relevant  level  of  government.  It  is  hypothesized  that  if  these  protective 
functions are all assigned to the national government,  this government  unit has a 
real incentive to maximize a net surplus because there are no effective controls on 
its taxing powers.  The presence  of fiscal decentralization  constrains  government, 
encouraging it to devolve to increase the efficiency in providing goods and services 
to  its  respective  jurisdictional  inhabitants;  otherwise  local  citizens  will  vote  on 
their feet. This contributes an effective constraint on excessive taxing from all 
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government  units.  As  a  result,  the  size  of  the  SNGs,  and  then  the  size  of  the 
aggregate government sector, decreases. 
In  general,  the  Leviathan  hypothesis  and  public  choices  approach  to  fiscal 
federalism provided a new perspective on government which highlighted the main 
advantage of fiscal decentralization  as a force for maintaining smaller government. 
 
Total government intrusion into the economy should be smaller, ceteris paribus, 
the greater the extent to which taxes and expenditures are decentralised, the more 
homogeneous  are the separate units, the smaller the jurisdictions,  and the lower 
the net regional rents. (Brennan and Buchanan, 1980, p. 185) 
 
2.5  A Brief Characterization of the First Generation Theory 
 
In broad  terms,  it may be concluded  that there  are two general  streams  of first 
generation  theory,  with  Tiebout  having  a  major  influence  on  both.  There  are  
(i) studies that draw on Tiebout’s impure local public goods concept and integrate 
it with the Musgravian framework and (ii) studies that draw on Tiebout’s notion of 
inter-jurisdictional  mobility and link it with forces that limit the size of the public 
sector. The work of Oates, for example, would fall under the first category, referred 
to here  as the ‘core’  first generation  theory  of fiscal  decentralization,  while  the 
public  choice  approach  of Brennan  and Buchanan  would  fall under  the second, 
non-core, category. Importantly,  though, the non-core public choice approach is a 
‘complement’ to ‘core’ first generation theory, as it relates to the particular question 
of fiscal decentralization. 
 
 
3.  Core First Generation Approaches to Fiscal Decentralization 
 
3.1  The Assignment of Service Delivery Responsibilities 
 
The  economic  boundary  of  individuals’  net  benefits  (benefits  less  costs)  from 
the   provision   of   public   goods   may   extend   beyond   the   political   boundary 
of  the  host  jurisdiction,  in  which  case  positive  fiscal  externalities  are  provided 
to residents of neighbouring  jurisdictions.  The economic boundary of individuals’ 
net benefits from public goods may also fall within the formal political boundary 
of the government which provides them, in which case some residents within one 
jurisdiction receive a benefit which exceeds the costs they pay, while other residents 
within that jurisdiction receive a benefit that is less than the costs they pay. Finally, 
the economic  boundary  of a public  good  matches  the political  boundary  of the 
government  that  provides  it. Prima  facie,  only  the  final  relationship  reveals  the 
presence of economic efficiency in providing public goods; the first two cases are 
inefficient. 
‘Core’   first  generation   theory   of  fiscal  decentralization   reveals   the  above 
relationship  well.  However,  it  does  not  represent  a  fully  deterministic  system 
for the efficient assignment of responsibilities  across various levels of government 
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for the provision of particular services. Only general ‘principles’ are evident from 
the efficiency analysis under the first generation theory, with the notion of ‘fiscal 
equivalence’ being an especially important concept. In general, five main principles 
of fiscal decentralization  may be deduced from ‘core’ first generation theory. 
First,  pure  nationally  bounded  public  goods  are  more  efficiently   provided 
by the national government (Bird, 2000). For example, foreign policy, defence, 
immigration  and international  trade can be best formulated  and implemented  by 
the national government.  Services should be provided by the national government 
when  demand  is at a constant  level  across  the various  subnational  localities.  In 
addition,  centralized  provision  of public services also experiences  a great benefit 
from economies of scale. 
Second, based on the principle of fiscal equivalence and Oates’s decentralization 
theorem,  the  geographic  boundaries  of  the  diverse  range  of  local  public  goods 
should align (as far as possible) with political boundaries of the second-tier 
governments  (states)  and  the  third-tier  governments  (local  governments).  SNGs 
are able to provide  a range  of services  to local communities  such as law, order  
and public  safety,  education,  health  policy,  as well  as very  local  issues  such  as 
the street lighting system, local sewerage, garbage collection, and local paper deliveries. 
Importantly, variations in the level of provision of public services across subnational 
regions provide a basis for partially redressing (i) spill-over effects and (ii) congested 
effects. 
Third, public provision  of both pure ‘private’  goods and impure SNGs’ public 
goods and services should be based on the size of jurisdiction,  and in accordance 
with  local  tastes  and  preferences  (Shah,  2004).  If  the  size  of  jurisdiction  is 
considered,  the  principle  of benefit  matching  is achieved  because  local  citizens 
who receive benefits also bear costs. A system of fees and user charges may also 
be useful and effective  for the purpose  of cost recovery  (McLure  and Martinez- 
Vazquez, 2004). SNGs operate closely to local inhabitants so that they are the sole 
agents, who are in the best position to understand preferences, tastes and the amount 
demanded. Once the ‘benefit areas’ can be established, local provision on the basis 
of cost recovery tailors local service provision to the demands of local people. This 
enhances  economic  efficiency.  Related  to this, local provision  of public  services 
may also result in experimentation,  and then innovation,  to promote efficiency in 
public policy for the entire economy (Oates, 1999). This suggests that devolution 
may also have ‘dynamic’ efficiencies. 
Fourth, the assignment of responsibility for the various types of service delivery 
must be transparent  and clearly understood  and agreed by all parties.1   Failure to 
do so results  in the overlapping  of publicly  provided  services.  Clear assignment 
of  responsibility  for  service  provision  limits  co-sharing  responsibilities,  where 
more than one level of government  gets involved  in the same areas of spending 
(Martinez-Vazquez,  2001). Co-sharing,  while sometimes  unavoidable,  can lead to 
ambiguity  which creates unnecessary  coincidence  in providing  public services  to 
local communities,  and, in turn, negatively  affects the efficiency  of the spending 
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programmes.  It  may  even  be  used  to  intentionally  confuse  the  responsibilities 
of  each  level  of  government.  This  may  result  in  fiscal  illusion  – local  citizens 
may misjudge the ‘true’ benefits and costs of their government (Dollery and 
Worhington,  1999).  Two  effects  associated  with  the  notion  of  a  citizen’s  fiscal 
illusion are widely recognized (Turnbull, 1998). First, public spending is maintained 
at  a  greater  level  under  fiscal  illusion  compared  with  perfect  information   – 
the  overspending  effect.  Related  to  this  is  the  ‘flypaper  effect’,  which  is  the 
prediction   that  intergovernmental   grants  from  high  level  government   usually 
stimulate  more  local  spending  than  locally  generated  revenue.  Clear  assignment 
of  responsibility   alone  does  not  necessarily   overcome   the  problem  of  fiscal 
illusion.2 
Fifth,  the  economies   of  scale  of  local  production   of  goods  and  services, 
including the related issues of local financial, managerial and administrative 
capabilities, should also be considered. This is particularly important for developing 
economies. As such, asymmetric spending assignment may be appropriate. That is, 
service delivery responsibility  may be different across the same level jurisdictions 
when there are different  economies  of scale and administrative  capacities  across 
governments   within  the  same  level  of  SNGs.  However,   in  reality,  countries  
which  adopt  this type of spending  assignment  usually  do so for political  and/or 
geographical reasons (Joumard and Kongsrud, 2003). 
In short,  the first generation  theory  of fiscal  decentralization  suggests  that, in 
general, service provision  responsibilities  are best assigned to the lowest level of 
government  that can meet the service responsibility  efficiently  (Bird, 2004). That 
is, the so-called ‘law of subsidiarity’ is a simple summary of first generation theory. 
The  law  of  subsidiarity  states  that  economic  performances  of  the  government 
become  more  productive,  efficient  and  effective  if  public  services  are  provided 
by  the  lowest  level  of  government  possible  (Martinez-Vazquez,   2001,  p.  12). 
Economic efficiency and accountability are essential features for SNGs’ fiscal 
autonomy in terms of service delivery. As such, efficiency and accountability  are 
strongly linked to the autonomy  of SNGs in fiscal matters, subject to the law of 
subsidiarity – first generation theory supports SNGs having the autonomy to decide 
the spending  programmes  within  their own jurisdiction.  This also minimizes  the 
national  interference  into  local  spending  programmes  through  the  requirements 
of SNGs’  accountability  to those  who  pay taxes  and charges.  The efficiency  of 
economic activities of SNGs is also enhanced because SNGs are in a better position 
to know where the money should be heading. 
 
 
3.2  The Assignment of Revenue-raising Powers 
 
The potential benefits of ‘efficient’ tax assignment have been an important subject 
for consideration  in first generation  theory of fiscal decentralization.  In terms of 
the degree of decentralization, the following assignments of revenue-raising powers 
represent  a  progressively  decreasing  level  of  SNGs’  fiscal  autonomy  (OECD, 
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1999):3   (i)  SNG  sets  tax  rate  and  tax  base;  (ii)  SNG  sets  tax  rate  only;  (iii) 
SNG sets tax base only; (iv) tax sharing arrangements  with two typical different 
levels – SNG determines  the revenue split or the national government  determines 
the split – and (v) national government sets rate and base of SNG tax. 
In an influential paper, Musgrave (1983) identified six fundamental principles for 
tax assignments:  (i) taxes suitable  for economic  stabilization  should be national; 
(ii) taxes  with  unevenly  distributed  bases  across  jurisdictions  should  be central; 
(iii) personal taxes with a mobility of tax bases should be assigned to the national 
government; (iv) taxes with cyclically stable revenue should be assigned to SNGs; 
(v) SNGs should be assigned  taxes with bases that are not easily mobile among 
jurisdictions; and (vi) benefit taxes, users’ fees and charges are relevant to any level 
of government. These six principles are discussed in turn below. 
The first three principles  concern taxes that should be assigned to the national 
government. Based on Musgrave’s contention that there are three branches of public 
finance (stabilization, distribution and allocation efficiency), fiscal decentralization 
is primarily justified in terms of allocation efficiency. The first principle reaffirms 
this  by  assigning  the  economic  stabilization  branch  to  the  national  government 
because it has responsibility for macroeconomics policy. Moreover, subnational 
stabilization   policies   are  likely   to  compromise   stability-oriented   policies   by 
‘leakage’ outside individual SNGs, which would effectively  diminish the national  
government’s  capacity  to  control  aggregate  demand.  As  such,  personal  income 
tax and corporate  income  tax are suitable  for national  governments  – especially 
when  income  redistribution  is a national  goal. However,  it is also argued  that a 
proportional income tax without any significant distribution goal can be a desirable 
source of revenue for SNGs because SNGs may decide to piggyback on the national 
income tax. In addition, together with the distributional issue, implementation issue 
is also an argument  for the inappropriateness  of the corporate  income  tax at the 
subnational  level.  The  second  principle  is  related  to  unevenly  distributed  taxes 
such as the natural resources  taxes. Natural resources  are unevenly  distributed  in 
some particular jurisdictions. Political and social tensions can be avoided if revenue 
from these sources  is centrally  generated  and redistributed  to all regions.  If not, 
jurisdictions  with  national  resources  may  decide  to  provide  local  services  at  a 
lower revenue-raising burden. The third principle is related to revenue sources with 
mobile bases. The concern is that tax rate differentials  between SNGs will cause 
inefficient movement of such bases across borders. 
Principles  four  and  five  concern  tax  assignment  fundamentals  necessary  to 
support SNGs. The fourth principle is designed to secure stable long-term sources 
of revenue for SNGs. Because of their relatively small fiscal size, SNGs’ need for 
relatively stable revenue flows is greater than that from the national government.4 
Stable revenue sources also assist with continuity of public service provision. The 
fifth principle is essentially the converse of the third principle – taxes with volatile 
mobile bases should be national, and tax bases that are immobile and stable should 
be managed by SNGs.5  Property and payroll taxes are two good examples. There 
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is a balance,  however,  that this principle  must strike with the second principle  – 
for example, natural resources tax (tax with unevenly distributed bases) should be 
with the national  government  even when they generate  stable revenue  flow. The 
property taxes are obviously  immobile but they may also be unevenly distributed 
across SNGs. 
The sixth principle concerns common types of government fees or charges which 
are efficient irrespective of whether imposed by the national government or SNGs. 
Each  level  of government  can  employ  charges  that  link  directly  to the  services 
provided. For example, driving licence fees and petrol tax can be used to finance 
a highway,  but not for education.  When  services  benefit  all people,  this type of 
charge is best administered by the national government. However, when the benefits 
are only directed to a particular group in a particular region, SNGs would be better 
placed to administer the charges. 
All  these  principles  are  designed  to  ensure  that  taxation  and  revenue-raising 
powers  across  all levels of government  do not distort  economic  choices  of non- 
government  entities  and  individuals.  However,  they  are  also  derived  from  the 
static welfare analysis – tax competition between jurisdictions is generally not 
supported because, of necessity, it distorts private decisions. There is no clear and 
explicit consideration given to the issue of whether the dynamic benefits for fiscal 
competition  between  SNGs generally,  and tax competition  specifically,  outweigh 
the ‘static’ welfare losses from the distortions to individual decisions resulting from 
tax competition.  
3.3  Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers 
 
The assignment  of responsibility  for service  deliveries  and taxing powers  across 
the  various   levels   of  government   is  the  first-order   (or  constitutional   level) 
issue  in  first  generation  theory.  Fiscal  transfers  between  levels  of  government 
are  essentially  a  second-order  (or  non-constitutional   level)  issue  in  the  sense 
that  they  are  conditioned  by  the  degree  of  vertical  fiscal  imbalance  under  the 
prevailing  assignment  of revenue  and expenditure  responsibilities  (or implied  by 
the constitution).  Nevertheless,  the literature on fiscal federalism  that investigates 
fiscal transfers,  usually from the national  government  to lower tiers, is extensive 
and detailed because the potential for formalized analysis of fiscal transfer issues is 
greater than in the case of the more fundamental issues concerning the assignment 
of fiscal powers. 
The  essential  point  concerning   fiscal  transfer  in  first  generation   theory  is 
that  transfers  are  either  ‘conditional’  (tied)  or  ‘unconditional’  (untied)  and  that 
each has different  consequences  for the fiscal autonomy  of SNGs (Oates, 1972). 
While unconditional  grants provide a higher degree of fiscal autonomy  of SNGs, 
conditional grants actually limit this autonomy. Fiscal autonomy of SNGs in terms 
of fiscal transfers is generally enhanced when the majority of grants from national 
government to SNGs are in the form of unconditional grants. That is, unconditional 
grants are generally supported  by first generation  theorists ahead of ‘conditional’ 
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grants (Bird, 2004) unless tied grants are required to correct for market failure or 
inter-jurisdictions  spill-over effects. 
Boadway (2003) argued that while fiscal equity is matched for unitary countries 
when  their  social  preferences  are  the  same  across  regions,  the  notion  of  fiscal 
equity is more or less ambiguous in federal countries because national governments 
and SNGs  use a mix of fiscal  policies  to achieve  a mix of redistribution  goals. 
Every  citizen  is  exposed  to  at  least  two  distinct  sets  of  fiscal  distribution  – 
one  from  the  national  government  and  another  from  SNGs.  When  there  are 
differences  in taxing capability between jurisdictions,  and, as a result, differences 
in provision of services to the given standard among different regions, horizontal 
fiscal  imbalance  arises.  Imbalance  in  the  fiscal  capacity  of  SNGs  at  the  same 
level is associated  horizontal  fiscal inequity.  This phenomenon  can be caused by 
differences in local wealth, natural resources, per capita tax capacity, and differences 
in spending  obligations  and  in the  cost  of providing  public  services  (Martinez- 
Vazquez,  2001).  The  main  tool  for  achieving  equity  through  intergovernmental 
fiscal  transfers   is  the  mechanism   ‘fiscal  equalization’.   Fiscal  equalization   is 
a  process  which  reduces  fiscal  disparities  among  subnational  regions  through 
financial  transfers  (Collins,  2001).  The four main reasons  for fiscal equalization 
are  identified  in Schroeder  and  Smoke  (2003):  (i) to fill  the  fiscal  vertical  gap 
between  national  government  and SNGs  in aggregate;  (ii) to equalize  horizontal 
fiscal  capacity  for  governments   in  the  same  level;  (iii)  to  internalize   fiscal 
externalities  within  SNGs  and  (iv)  to  correct  the  administrative  weaknesses  of 
SNGs.  
3.3.1  Fiscal Equalization 
 
The first generation  theory of fiscal equalization  is the most developed  strand of 
the economics of fiscal decentralization.  Perhaps the most formal developments in 
this field concern the question of fiscal equalization arrangements. 
Economists   first   came   to  this   issue   of  fiscal   equalization   because   of  a 
concern  over resource  misallocation  resulting  from one jurisdiction,  say a ‘rich’ 
state, subsidizing another jurisdiction, say a ‘poor’ state, through equalization 
arrangements.  A  seminal  study  in  this  regard  is  ‘A  note  on  grants  in  federal 
countries’  by Scott  (1950),  the specific  concern  being  that, as labour  is mobile, 
fiscal  equalization  will have the effect  of inducing  residents  to low productivity 
(i.e. poor) jurisdictions  and away from high productivity  (i.e. rich) jurisdictions, 
causing  a decline  in the value of national  output.  However,  fiscal transfers  from 
one government  to another have some important differences  from the case where 
governments  subsidize private enterprises.  First, fiscal equalization  is, in effect, a 
transfer between states where all states pursue equity goals within their jurisdiction 
by providing some individuals with a positive fiscal residuum or net fiscal benefits 
(value  of  public  benefits  consumed  less  taxes  paid  to  some  individuals)  and  a 
negative fiscal residuum or negative net fiscal benefits to other individuals. Second, 
in addition to equity issues, the ‘local’ character of subnational  public goods has 
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potentially adverse congestion effects in very populous and highly productive (rich) 
jurisdictions  which  can  reduce  the  value  of public  goods  in those  jurisdictions. 
Moreover,  services  provided  by SNGs  may have benefits  (or costs)  that are not 
confined to the geographic area of the jurisdiction that provided the service. Once 
these ‘fiscal externalities’  factors were recognized,  it was no longer obvious that 
the ‘subsidies’ from one (or many) government(s) to other governments necessarily 
lead to a misallocation  of resources.  Under certain  circumstances,  such transfers 
may even be efficiency enhancing. 
Perhaps the first true classic study in this field after Scott was ‘Federalism  and 
fiscal equity’ by Buchanan (1950). Although equity is the focus of the proposition 
that ‘like individuals’ in different jurisdictions should receive ‘like treatments’ 
(Buchanan,  1950,  p. 588),  it has  an important  implication  for efficiency  too.  If 
all jurisdictions  of a given level provide greater positive net fiscal benefits to the 
poor,  but  do  so  to  different  degrees,  then  inefficient  migration  will  result:  rich 
citizens will have an incentive to relocate to the jurisdiction  where their negative 
net  fiscal  benefit  will  be  the  least  and  poor  citizens  will  have  an  incentive  to 
relocate to jurisdictions with the highest positive net fiscal subsidy for the poor. If 
fiscal equalization  transfers  result in the like treatment  of like individuals  across 
different subnational jurisdictions  in a federation, then ‘like’ rich people will face 
the  same  negative  net  fiscal  subsidy  in all  jurisdictions,  and  ‘like’  poor  people 
will  also  face  the same  positive  net fiscal  subsidy  in all jurisdictions.  As such, 
there is no fiscally  induced  incentive  resulting  for intergovernmental  transfers  to 
distort  migration.  Of  course,  this  is  predicated  on  the  view  that  all  SNGs  use 
fiscal powers to achieve the same vertical fiscal equity goals (i.e. redistribution  of 
income).  
Buchanan’s equity approach sets aside the influence of congestion in local public 
services  and  the  effects  of  spill-overs.  These  issues  were  investigated  more  by 
scholars,  such as Buchanan  and Wagner in ‘An efficiency  basis for federal fiscal 
equalisation’.  Buchanan  and  Wagner  pointed  out  that,  for  any  constant  level  of 
public facility, an addition of one more consumer will reduce the quantity of 
consumption units available to other people (Buchanan and Wagner, 1980, p. 244). 
This  is because  local  public  goods  may  be  subject  to congestion.  Furthermore, 
given the public good character of service provision, people who move to the high 
productive (i.e. richer) state ‘exerts an external economy on residents of that state 
and an external  diseconomy  on residents  of the state that he leaves’  (Buchanan 
and Wagner, 1980, p. 245). However, when SNGs provide impure public goods, a 
point is reached where the highly productive state faces an external diseconomy – 
the benefit to all residents from tax-side externalities (i.e. the reduced average cost 
of public good provision) is swamped by congestion costs. In such circumstances, 
fiscal equalization may enhance efficiency by preventing inefficient migration from 
poor to rich states.  The important  contribution  of Buchanan  and Wagner  is that 
they identify the circumstances  when, from a pure resource allocation perspective, 
fiscal equalization is economically efficient. 
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In addition to the fundamental issues of congestions and other fiscal externalities 
such as spill-overs  (i.e. economic  consequences  of the activities  of an SNG that 
spill outside the border of that SNG), a number of other important ‘complications’ 
have emerged in the theory of fiscal equalization. These include the efficiency 
implications including the correct treatment in fiscal equalization processes of 
economic  ‘rents’  (Boadway  and  Flatters,  1982,  p.  621)  and  differences  in  the 
‘unit  cost’  of  services  in  different  SNGs.  When  economic  rents  from  mineral 
activities differ between states and they are taxed by an SNG that is subject to fiscal 
equalization, should those rents collected by the SNG be equalized (effectively 
allocating rents on a per capita or some other basis across all equalized subnational 
jurisdictions)  or should the SNGs in which the rents are generated keep the taxes 
from  that  rent?  Likewise,  in  SNGs  where  the  unit  costs  of  inputs  required  to 
produce  local  public  services  are above  those  for other  SNGs,  should  the high- 
cost SNGs be subsidized for their higher unit costs through the fiscal equalization 
process? 
In regard to rent analysis, Boadway and Flatters (1982) demonstrated that fiscal 
equalization represents an efficiency enhancing mechanism. Individuals will choose 
to reside in the jurisdiction that provides them with a highest net benefit, but when 
there are location specific rents, migration equilibria will not equate with the point 
where marginal products are equal across jurisdictions (i.e. the efficient point) but 
where average products are equal. As in the case of congestion, fiscal equalization 
provides  one mechanism  by which migration  distortions  due to location  specific 
rents can be eliminated. 
Petchey (1995) has also investigated the interaction between equalization in the 
presence of both rents and unit cost differentials. His economic simulations illustrate 
that, in the presence of diverse economic rents and diverse unit costs across regions, 
fiscal equalization  processes  which equalize  for unit cost can enhance  economic  
efficiency.  Based  on a simplified  two states model,  he demonstrated  that, in the 
absence of economic rents, efficient fiscal equalization  will not transfer resources 
from the ‘low’ cost state to the ‘high’ cost state. However, when a state has high 
costs in conjunction  with low economic rents (all determined relative to the other 
states),  efficient  fiscal equalization  transfers  will transfer  resources  from the low 
cost/high rent state to the high cost/low rent state. 
Finally,  it should be noted that there is a basic issue concerning  what exactly 
should  be  equalized  –  the  capacity  of  governments  for  providing  services  (i.e. 
fiscal capacity) or the actual fiscal performance of a government (i.e. fiscal 
performances).  The literature tends to implicitly  focus on fiscal performance  (for 
example Buchanan, 1950; Scott, 1950; Buchanan and Wagner, 1980) but in practice 
it is generally fiscal capacity that is equalized.6 
 
 
3.4  Subnational Borrowings 
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SNGs’  access  to  the  financial  market  has  been  a  controversial  issue  for  some 
time – especially in the literature relating to developing countries (Ter-Minassian, 
1996).  Compared  with  the  national  government,  some  argue  that  SNGs  have poor  
accounting  and  disclosure  standards  and  rely  on  the  national  government to bail 
out a debt crisis when there is a conflict of interests between lenders and borrowers.  
However,  there are three main grounds  to support  SNGs’  borrowings (World Bank, 
2004). First, SNGs’ investment  expenditure  entirely financed  from current tax 
revenue is inappropriate  for equity reasons. Investment brings benefits for  future  
generations  so  that  they  should  be,  at  least  partially,  responsible  for their spending. 
Second, the mismatch between revenue and expenditure evident in most federations 
also requires SNGs’ borrowings in particular years as subnational economies fluctuate. 
Third, and most importantly from the perspective of first generation  theory,  borrowings  
from SNGs  may foster  political  accountability.  In the  absence  of  significant  
intervention  from  the  national  government,  financial markets will send a clear signal 
of SNGs’ performances by providing borrowings or blocking them access into the 
financial markets. As the first approximation in which inter-jurisdictional  fiscal 
externality is ignored, first generation theory suggests that SNGs  should  have some  
responsibility  for the management  and service  of their own debt, but in conjunction  
with transparent accounting arrangements  for public sector finances. 
In practice,  one of the main  questions  of interest  to scholars  is the extent  of 
the budget constraint to be imposed on SNGs by a national government (Ter- 
Minassian, 1996, p. 156): a soft budget constraint and a hard budget constraint. A 
hard budget constraint means that the national government will not bail out SNGs 
for excessive  debts under any circumstances.  This approach  requires the national 
government to provide a clear message to the market – no bailout policy for SNGs’ 
debts.  In this  case,  SNGs  have  no  ‘incentives’  to over-borrow  and  fail  to meet 
financial  responsibility.  On the other side, soft budget constraint  means, to some 
extent, subnational debts are implicitly guaranteed by the national government. This 
approach has usually been adopted in countries with high levels of fiscal transfers.  
In this case, local regions  are very much dependent  on outside-sourced  revenue, 
not their own-sourced revenue.7 
 
 
4.  An Emerging Second Generation Approaches to Fiscal Decentralization 
 
Oates’s decentralization theorem has laid a strong foundation for the study of fiscal 
federalism and decentralization,  all of which developed from the general literature 
on public economics. The result was what is now called the first generation theory 
of  fiscal  decentralization.  However,  towards  the  end  of  the  last  decade  of  the 
twentieth century, a ‘second’ generation theory of fiscal decentralization has begun 
to emerge,  which  draws  on ideas  from  outside  the public  finance  literature.  As 
Oates (2005,  p. 356) has highlighted,  this second  generation  began investigating 
fiscal decentralization by drawing on notions from the theory of the firm, the economics  
of  information,  the  principal–agent  problem,  and  the  theory  of  the contract. 
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Two  main  considerations  underlie  the  development  of  the  second  generation 
theory  (Oates,  2005,  p. 356).  The  first  concerns  the  political  processes  and  the 
behaviour  of political  agents in which participants  may have their own objective 
functions. Government officials may not need to seek the common good as assumed 
in the first generation  theory;  rather,  they may not act to maximize  the welfare 
of  their  constituencies.   This  consideration  has  obvious  links  to  public  choice 
theory – which was the main ‘non-core’  stream of the first generation  theory of 
fiscal decentralization.  The second concerns  the issue of asymmetric  information 
and political  agents.  Some  particular  participants  have more  knowledge  of local 
preferences and tastes and cost structure compared to the others. To examine these 
influences,  fiscal  federalism  is  examined  from  the  perspective  of  a  framework 
on industrial  organization  and microeconomic  theory.  Much  of this work by the 
second  generation  theorists  concerns  the issue of balance  between  the degree  of 
fiscal centralization and fiscal decentralization. While the general support for fiscal 
decentralization in the first generation theory is acknowledged, the dangers of going 
too far in the fiscally decentralized  system are a feature of the second generation 
theory. 
The emerging second generation theory has been characterized  in terms of two 
motivating issues: incentives and knowledge (Vo, 2008). Both motivations have 
contributed to an increased economic efficiency: incentives are required for SNGs 
to do a better job to avoid outward migration of people and firms; and knowledge 
of  local  preferences  and  tastes  is  crucial  to  achieve  economic  efficiency  when 
local public goods and services  are provided  by SNGs. The contributions  of the 
second generation theory are mainly drawn from the economics of transaction cost, 
incomplete contracts and principal–agent  perspectives (Vo, 2008). Leading studies, 
that  have  been  classed  as  parts  in  the  emerging  second  generation  theory,  are 
associated with Weingast (1995), Seabright (1996), Lockwood  (2002) and Besley 
and Coate (2003). 
Weingast  (1995)  introduced  the  notion  of  market  preserving  federalism  to 
investigate how competing jurisdictions create incentives for credible commitment  
and lower  transaction  costs.  Assuming  a hierarchy  of governments  (at least two 
levels  of  government  rule  the  same  land  and  people)  with  autonomy  of  each 
level of government institutionalized, Weingast modelled the market preserving 
federalism  in  which  (i)  SNGs  have  regulatory  responsibility  over  the  economy, 
(ii)  a  common  market  is  ensured  so  that  SNGs  are  unable  to  prevent  trade  in 
goods and services from other jurisdictions and (iii) SNGs face a hard budget 
constraint. The main findings, for the UK and the USA are (i) federalism provides 
the political basis for the common market; (ii) the prohibitions against the national 
government’s  exercise  of economic  regulation  greatly  reduced  the  government’s 
political responsiveness to interest groups; and (iii) the prohibitions on internal trade 
barriers  allowed  entrepreneurs,  new  enterprises,  and  new  economic  activities  to 
emerge in new areas that could outcompete interests in older areas (Weingast, 1995, 
p. 25). 
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In contrast, Seabright (1996) introduced the notion of ‘incomplete contract’ to the 
analysis of fiscal federalism. The author presents elections as incomplete contracts 
in which some information, in the ‘contract’, is unverifiable. Political accountability 
can be an organizational  motivation for decentralization.  In contrast, centralization 
could be more preferred when the mechanisms associated with incomplete contract 
provide greater scope for policy cooperation between different levels of government 
to internalize inter-jurisdictional  fiscal externalities. As a consequence, the decision 
on preferred mechanism depends on the relative magnitude between benefits from 
internalization  of inter-jurisdictional  fiscal  externality  and costs  arising  due to a 
reduced accountability  under fiscal centralization. 
The  starting  point  for  Lockwood   (2002)  and  Besley  and  Coate  (2003)  is 
Oates’s  decentralization   theorem,  but  these  authors  correctly  pointed  out  that 
goods and services provided by the national government are not necessarily 
homogeneous, as Oates had originally assumed.8  Once it is recognized that national 
provision of public goods and services is possible on a differential  basis between 
regions,  a  different  fiscal  framework  is  needed  from  that  developed  by  Oates. 
In  their  frameworks,  output  provided  by  the  national  government  consists  of 
locally  designed  outputs  which  are  determined  by  the  central  legislation.  This 
is  feasible  because  the  national  government   body  always  consists  of  locally 
elected representatives from local regions. Nevertheless, the broad thrust of Oates’s 
findings   on  the  efficiency   of  decentralized   fiscal  arrangement   is  reproduced 
in models in which inter-jurisdictional externalities are small and regions are 
heterogeneous. 
Another  contribution  to second  generation  theory  of fiscal  decentralization  is 
evident from recent studies of Australian fiscal equalization by Petchey and 
Levtchenkova (2002, 2004), which pointed out that equalization grants are not 
determined  exogenously.  This is because  equalization  is undertaken  with respect 
to  a fiscal  standard  that  is  determined  in  relation  to  actual  fiscal  behaviour.  In 
this circumstance, there is an incentive for the states to behave strategically in their 
fiscal decisions. This provides the basis for an ‘equalization game’ which takes into 
account states’ strategic  behaviour  and provides  a basis for developing  proposals 
which enhance efficiency.  
The generally accepted view now is that the presence of the second generation theory 
of fiscal decentralization  classifies,  rather than contradicts,  the validity  of the first 
generation, including the decentralization  theorem: 
 
Although the models under the second generation theory umbrella differ in 
fundamental  ways  from  the  first  generation  theory,  many  of  them  produce  a 
trade-off between centralisation and decentralisation that is in a somewhat similar 
spirit to their earlier counterparts. (Oates, 2005, p. 357) 
 
Finally,  a second  generation  of public  choice  theory  is also emerging.  This is 
mainly  associated  with the work of Wagner  (2007),  which  shifts  attention  away 
from ‘tiers’ of government,  and assignment  of powers and responsibilities  across 
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tiers, to focus on the competing ‘polycentric’ character of government. This is 
associated  with  a focus  on the process  by which  diverse  centres  of government 
respond to demands for publicly provided services in a manner that is integrated 
within the market economy. 
Wagner’s basic view on the evolutionary character of polycentric government is 
more important than the hierarchical aspect of government in which the questions of 
which functions to be provided at the national and subnational levels of government 
are addressed (Wagner, 2007, pp. 164–165),  as it is in the conventional  approach 
to fiscal decentralization.  The process by which governments respond to emerging 
demand from the community  is directly linked to the capacity to raise their own 
revenue in an innovative  way. Moreover,  the focus is on government  ‘enterprise’, 
in which  some  government  units  fulfil  the role  of public  service  producers  and 
some  take  on the  role  of the  articulators  of the  public  services  (Wagner,  2007, 
p. 166). 
 
 
 
5.  Concluding Remarks 
 
The  paper  provides  a  general  and  brief  overview  of  the  main  insights  from 
the literature  on fiscal  decentralization  with  the focus  exclusively  on theoretical 
developments of fiscal federalism and decentralization.  It reveals the findings from 
the  first  generation  theory,  as  represented  by  seminal  studies  from  Musgrave, 
Tiebout,  Olson  and Oates,  ‘fiscal  equivalence’,  population  sorting  and the fiscal 
decentralization   theorem.  It  also  points  to  the  public  choice  stream  of  first 
generation   theory  and  an  emerging   second  theory  of  fiscal  decentralization, 
which  mainly  concerns  the efficiency  trade-off  between  fiscal  centralization  and 
decentralization. 
The key point to note is that the notion of decentralization plays a very important 
role in the theory of fiscal federalism; irrespective of whether core or non-core first 
or second  generation  theory  is being  considered,  decentralization  is the primary 
issue of concern. For the purpose of this paper, one important implication  of this 
overview is that any empirical testing of this theory requires a ‘sound’ measure of 
fiscal decentralization.  That is, there must be a measure of fiscal decentralization 
that reflects important features of fiscal theory.
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Notes 
 
1.  The  origin  of  the  third  type  of  argument  derived  from  public  choice  theory  – 
especially the notion of fiscal illusion and the flypaper effect (Turnbull, 1998). 
2.  The assignment must not generate inefficient signals in which one level of government 
has an incentive to oversupply or undersupply services. Healthcare provision in Germany 
is an example. In Germany, the health fund from the national government is 
responsible  for financing  the costs of hospitals.  The Landers  (the first level of 
SNGs) finance hospital investment and decide hospital capacity. The municipalities 
(the second level of SNGs) are assigned to provide local healthcare services. In this 
context, the Landers have an incentive  to expand hospital capacity to create local 
employment whereas the operating costs have to be met by the national government 
(Wurzel, 1999). 
3.  A referee argued that the OECD has missed the first most important  form of tax 
autonomy: whether subnational governments have discretion of not to introduce their 
own tax. 
4.  Of course, there are other ways for SNGs to manage the revenue volatility  issue. 
Governments  could  ‘sell’  volatile  revenue  flow  to  a  buyer  who  was  prepared  to 
exchange a stable revenue flow. Alternatively, cyclical accounts could be established 
which are drawn down by SNGs in recessions, and added to during booms. 
5.  Parry (2003) shows that competition  among various subnational  governments  may 
lead to a suboptimal level of capita taxation when governments ignore the ‘external 
benefits’ of capita flight to other regions. 
6.  Mathews (1980), Musgrave (1980) and Zabalza (2003) have distinguished five main 
types of models of fiscal equalization:  (i) the fiscal capacity  equalization;  (ii) the 
fiscal potential equalization; (iii) the pure incentive model of fiscal decentralization; 
(iv) the actual performance equalization and (v) the Mathews model. The emerging 
second generation theory of fiscal decentralization considers some aspects of capacity 
equalization. First, Mathews raised two main aspects of fiscal capacity equalization: 
equalization  of  revenue-raising  capacity  and  equalization  of  expenditure  needs, 
similar to that which is applied in Australia (see Section 2.3.3). Second, the fiscal 
potential model equalizes the fiscal potential levels for SNGs to achieve their own goals).  
Third,  the  pure  incentive  model  of  fiscal  equalization  is  done  to  give  an incentive 
to subnational regions by providing matching grants to them to raise their tax and 
service levels. This model of fiscal equalization  may have redistributional effects 
with respect to fiscal capacity and/or fiscal need of various regions. Fourth, the 
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equalization is demonstrated by the national government by equalizing actual per capita 
dollar outlays on subnational  services  in all subnational  regions and taking into 
account the difference of needs of various regions. Fifth, the Mathews model has  
developed on the foundation of the fiscal capacity model of fiscal equalization and 
explored various specific situations, such as taking into account (i) a revenue effort 
adjustment factor or (ii) a revenue capacity equalization factor. 
7.  In order to limit a possible weakness of the guarantee for subnational debt repayment, 
many restrictions have been imposed such as no borrowings, borrowings for limited 
purposes, and ceiling amount control (Rodden, 2000). While these soft constraints 
are moderately flexible, the approach experiences the problem of the commons. The 
commitment  to bailouts  for subnational  debts by national  governments  may bring 
fiscal benefits for SNGs as an entity; however, it need not benefit the residents of 
subnational  regions when this is achieved by reducing the financial accountability 
of SNGs  and damaging  the national  economy.  It is very costly,  however,  for the 
economy as a whole. 
8.  It should be noted that public choice economists such as Brennan and Buchanan had 
previously objected to this. 
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